Explanations

In Dayton Z. Phillips & Peter G. Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein. Blackwell. pp. 125–158 (1989)
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Abstract

This chapter explores the status of Wittgenstein's methodological remarks about the role of explanation. In §109 Wittgenstein provides one of his most extensive reflections on methodology. In many cases, scientific explanation works by hypothesizing entities whose behavior explains the behavior of familiar things. In hypothesizing entities whose behavior explains the behavior of familiar entities, the scientific explanation is metaphysically promiscuous. The metaphysical promiscuity of explanations that try to ape the scientific variety is signaled in the idea of the “super” order. The claim on offer in §109 is that philosophy only offers insightful descriptions. The sense of fit is the subject's sense that one's own experience has a shape or form in which things occupy a place in which they belong. The idea of the investigations is suggested as an aesthetic project. It leaves space to endorse the idea of primitive normativity, that is, the sense of fit.

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