A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness

Analysis 61 (1):3-4 (2001)
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10.1093/analys/61.1.3

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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.
The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 156-173.

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