Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):48-62 (1974)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This Article does not have an abstract

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,676

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Functionalism, sensations, and materialism.Larry J. Eshelman - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74.
Body and mind: The identity thesis.A. Campbell Garnett - 1965 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):77-81.
Turing machines and mental reports.Robert H. Kane - 1966 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):344-52.
About the identity theory.James E. Tomberlin - 1965 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):295-99.
Mental Causation and Mental Reality.Tim Crane - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:185-202.
Representation and Reality. [REVIEW]J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (2):426-428.
Compatibilism and the free will defense.John Bishop - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.
Consciousness and introspective knowledge.Jack C. Carloye - 1991 - Methodology and Science 8:8-22.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
218 (#116,985)

6 months
13 (#250,881)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Realization and the metaphysics of mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Naturalizing intentions.R. J. Nelson - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):173 - 203.
Armstrong's materialism.George S. Pappas - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (September):569-592.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
The mental life of some machines.Hilary Putnam - 1966 - In Hector-Neri Castañeda (ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Detroit,: Wayne State University Press.
Comments.Alvin Plantinga - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (20):585-587.

View all 6 references / Add more references