Is Hart's Rationale for Legal Excuses Workable?

Dialogue 8 (3):496-502 (1969)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

H. L. A. Hart's new book of essays rejects any theory of the classic retributive type for justifying legal punishment. Hart denies that useless punishments can be justified even of fully guilty men; he rejects as the justifying aim of punishment the hope of crowning wickedness with the suffering it deserves; he denies that great guilt could justify a more severe punishment than utility-considerations would call for. We will be concerned here with only one of his arguments supporting this rejection: the objection that mere human judges cannot measure wickedness accurately enough to see that each degree of wickedness gets the appropriate amount of suffering. And of course modern fashions of determinist thinking have brought home to us even more vividly the absurdity of trying to measure wickedness, since determinism makes us wonder if we know how much any offender could have helped doing what he did.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,169

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hart on Responsibility.C. G. Pulman (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Time and Retribution.Patrick Tomlin - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (5):655-682.
Is Kant a retributivist?M. Tunick - 1996 - History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.
A Retributive Argument Against Punishment.Greg Roebuck & David Wood - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):73-86.
Punishment: A Postscript to Two Prolegomena.Robert A. Samek - 1966 - Philosophy 41 (157):216 - 232.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-25

Downloads
23 (#983,168)

6 months
6 (#572,300)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references