Abstract

The thesis proffers a critique of certain prominent varieties of scientism and proposes an integral humanism in response to them. Chapter one surveys various prominent forms of philosophical naturalism and scientism and, in particular, the ways in which these depend upon histories of the sciences and their successes. Chapter two turns specifically to a criticism of Alex Rosenberg’s strong scientism and the ways in which, I contend, it denigrates, in a self-contradictory manner, the sort of histories on which it is in some such crucial sense reliant. I also note the way in which Wilfrid Sellars’s scientia mensura principle is in important respects a kind of precursor to Rosenberg’s views and how it faces some of the same besetting problems. Chapter three broadens the scope of my argument and turns to what several recent authors have termed weak scientism, which they take to avoid some of the flagrant pitfalls of the more extreme views of Rosenberg and others. I contend there that, while something of an improvement, weak scientism nonetheless is still problematic, particularly for the way in which it presumptively takes the sciences to be the best or most paradigmatic modes of inquiry, to the detriment of what others take to be more humane or non-objectifying forms of inquiry. Chapter four furthers this critique by tending specifically to the ways in both weak and strong scientistic approaches either fundamentally mishandle or prejudicially address various matters religious. I draw here lively connections between such scientistic approaches and the reasoning of certain prominent philosophers and public intellectuals who defend and promote secular humanism. Finally, chapter five offers an articulation of what I call integral or expansive humanism, a contrastive approach I take to deal much more ably and unproblematically with the characteristic concerns that beset the foregoing varieties of scientism.