Probing the Unorthodox: Moderate Direct Control over Implicit Bias

Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-28 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The consensus among philosophers is that indirect control is the only plausible type of control that individuals can exercise over implicit bias. By contrast, direct control over implicit bias is dismissed as implausible. It is dismissed on two grounds. First, direct control is susceptible to the rebound effect. Second, the nature of implicit bias belies direct control. This paper grates against the prevailing philosophical consensus by defending direct control against its dismissal. Accordingly, I argue that the rebound effect is not a knock-down-drag-out phenomenon against direct control. I further argue that philosophers have an unnuanced view of the rebound effect and represent it in ways that betray inaccuracies. I argue that this opens up some space to develop a moderate view of direct control over implicit bias. The view I develop is rooted in dual-system theory and the findings of experimental social psychology and neuroscience. Taken together, the evidence suggests two things: (1) the nature of implicit bias does not always belie direct control, and (2) that a moderate type of direct control over implicit bias is plausible. I end with a caution against treating indirect control as the standard-bearer for control over implicit bias. Indirect control is secured by undertaking control-based intervention techniques. But evidence suggests that the effects of these techniques fade over time. I do not suggest, however, that indirect control be jettisoned. Instead, I propose that it be used as a strategy along with moderate direct control such that no ameliorative avenue is foreclosed.

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Phil Mack
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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