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What Is It Like to Have Visual Imagery?
In Susan Aldworth & Matthew MacKisack (eds.), Extreme Imagination: Inside the Eye's Mind. pp. 21-29 (2018)
Abstract
How does visual imagination differ from visual perceptual experience? And how should we describe experiences of visual imagery? Moreover how can people who have visual imagery convey what it is like to have it to those who have never had it – congenital aphantisics? This paper addresses these questions using examples of illusions and other perceptual phenomena to hone in on the answers.Author's Profile
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