Emotion regulation and evaluative understanding

Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):777-798 (2020)
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Abstract

Emotions can enhance our evaluative understanding by mobilizing directed reflection, but notoriously, emotional reflection can also lead us astray. If our goal is evaluative understanding, then we...

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Shai Madjar
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (PhD)

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References found in this work

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):151 – 176.
Is understanding a species of knowledge?Stephen R. Grimm - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
What an emotion is: A sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.
Epistemic Emotions.Adam Morton - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 385--399.

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