Mathematical Epistemology

The Monist 67 (1):46-55 (1984)
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Abstract

The tenor of much recent work in the philosophy of mathematics has been dictated by the popular assumption that Platonism is defunct. Some embrace that assumption and look for alternatives, others deny it and attempt to revive Platonism, but either way it is the starting point. The fate of Platonism took center stage with the appearance of Paul Benacerraf’s “Mathematical truth”, but a decade has passed since then, and the philosophical climate has changed. Most important, the quarter from which Platonism was to receive its mortal wound—epistemology—has developed considerably; the epistemological theory presupposed by Benacerraf is no longer popular. This makes it difficult to assess the value of work in the philosophy of mathematics done under the influence of Benacerraf’s formulation.

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Penelope J. Maddy
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Epistemic logicism & Russell's regressive method.A. D. Irvine - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (3):303 - 327.
To bridge Gödel’s gap.Eileen S. Nutting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2133-2150.
Non-ontological Structuralism†.Michael Resnik - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):303-315.
Mathematics. A science of patterns?Gianluigi Oliveri - 1997 - Synthese 112 (3):379-402.

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