Abstract
Some accounts of social life give explanatory emphasis to normative requirements themselves. This paper resists such a tendency. It is argued that when normative requirements themselves are given explanatory priority the concept of social normativity tends to be situated between these requirements on the one hand, and the practice of evaluating conduct in accordance with those requirements. Normativity so situated is then required to bridge the justificatory gap between the two. It is further illustrated how such an explanatory structure is designed to avoid questions concerning the legitimacy of the exercise of power. Making room for the silence of social normativity involves paying theoretical attention to the time before the first instance of a problematisation of a certain way of doing, which is thereafter commonly described, under the benefit of hindsight, as a deviation from a rule that was implicit all along, and merely made explicit. Instead of believing or assuming that we are able to achieve mastery and control over the practices we engage in, we ought to recognise, instead, that persons are always and already, inevitably and necessarily, emotionally involved in certain common or joint objects that are, at any one time, invisible to them. Given the pervasiveness, tenacity and, sometimes, violence of the silence of social normativity, the vital question becomes: how can we educate future generations such that they are both capable and willing to reflect on the consequences of their practices?