Against Wonder

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 15 (2):45-57 (2020)
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Abstract

There are a growing number of publications arguing that if we had more wonder in social life, then its quality would be significantly improved, and that we therefore need an “ethics” or a “politics” of wonder. The aim of this paper is to show that that message is unfortunate, and this is for two reasons. First, wonder does not generally have the positive political and moral effects that are attributed to it, so to assume that it does may lead one to adopt unrealistic social policies. Second, wonder does potentially have a number of negative moral and politicaleffects, so social policies that put a premium on wonder may bring adverse consequences. In this way, the paper makes a general case against wonder as a positive force in morality and politics.

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References found in this work

The Moral Emotions.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wonder and the clinical encounter.H. M. Evans - 2012 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (2):123-136.
The Truth of the Barnacles.Kathleen Dean Moore - 2005 - Environmental Ethics 27 (3):265-277.

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