Some Remarks on For-me-ness and Empathy

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):625-629 (2015)
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Abstract

My discussion of Self and Other takes issue with two distinct theses defended by Zahavi. The first concerns Zahavi's argument for the first-personal character of experience and its related thought experiment. My second remark is about Zahavi’s restriction of empathy to direct perception

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Elisa Magrì
Boston College

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