What Scientists Know Is Not a Function of What Scientists Know

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):840-849 (2013)
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Abstract

There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense (the separate opinions of individual scientists) and a collective sense (the state of the discipline). The latter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly observed or reported. A function can be defined to map individual judgments onto an aggregate judgment. I argue that such a function cannot effectively capture community opinion, especially in cases that matter to us

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P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany

References found in this work

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Saving the phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Who knows: from Quine to a feminist empiricism.Lynn Nelson - 1990 - Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
A material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.

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