Anomalous experience and delusional thinking: The logic of explanations

In T. F. Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (eds.), Delusional Beliefs. John Wiley. pp. 15–33 (1988)
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Understanding as explaining: how motives can become causes.Thomas Fuchs - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (3):701-717.
Against a second factor.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-10.

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