Precis of The Objects of Credence

Economics and Philosophy 40 (2):469-471 (2024)
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Abstract

The Objects of Credence grew from a simple insight, which is that credence claims are opaque (or ‘hyperintensional’). This central idea can be illustrated using the following example:(1)Tom has a high credence that George Orwell is a writer.(2)Tom has a low credence that Eric Blair is a writer.

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Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

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