XIII—Dutch Book and Accuracy Theorems

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):309-327 (2021)
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Abstract

Dutch book and accuracy arguments are used to justify certain rationality constraints on credence functions. Underlying these Dutch book and accuracy arguments are associated theorems, and I show that the interpretation of these theorems can vary along a range of dimensions. Given that the theorems can be interpreted in a variety of different ways, what is the status of the associated arguments? I consider three possibilities: we could aggregate the results of the differently interpreted theorems in some way, and motivate rationality constraints based on this aggregation; we could be permissive, and accept the conclusions of the Dutch book and accuracy arguments under all interpretations of the associated theorems; or we could select one uniquely correct interpretation of the Dutch book or accuracy theorem, and use that to justify certain rationality constraints. I show that each possibility faces problems, and conclude that Dutch book and accuracy theorems cannot be used to justify any principle of rationality.

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Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

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