Abstract

Psychological ascriptions are most commonly understood to be Machiavellian and objective (Dennett 1987, Fodor 1987, Heal 1986, Whiten & Byrne 1988). We ascribe thoughts, feelings, and desires to others to better understand them. Since we must cooperate, compete, or simply co-exist with others, the more we know about their psychology the better. Being aimed at understanding others—in relative independence from us—psychological ascriptions are objective. Such ascriptions are also Machiavellian to the extent that their ultimate aim is to help us plan our interactions with others, so as best to serve our self-interest. Thinking about psychological ascriptions in this way permeates theorizing about folk psychology. It is true both of those that hold that psychological attribution is the result of the application of a psychological theory (theory theorists) and of those that maintain that it is the culmination of a process of simulation—Verstehen (simulationists). Both sides think that common sense psychology is, in some sense, continuous with science; theory theorists that it is continuous with natural science, simulationists that it is continuous with humanistic science. These views, I shall argue, are too narrow. Psychological ascriptions are pragmatic; their function varies from one context of ascription to another depending on our interests in others. Our interests are not always self-interests, nor are they to be understood as consciously entertained desires or projects. Our interests are shaped by our natures, and our natures include our sociality. So whereas the way we think about others is a function of our interests, those interests are much broader than the more narrow self-interests that we are aware of having. Folk psychological ascriptions need be neither Machiavellian nor objective.