Abstract

Any adequate theory of agency demands an account of what it is for an agent to have an action as an option, or of what I call the freedom relation. My dissertation develops just such an account. I argue, first, that attempts to reduce the freedom relation to something more basic fail, and therefore that we should be ontological primitivists about freedom; second, that attempts to give inferential justification for claims about the freedom relation fail, and therefore that we should be epistemic primitivists about freedom. I then sketch an account that satisfies both of these constraints. On this account, freedom is a simple relation which is immediately perceived by agents, through familiar mechanisms of bodily awareness. I finally turn to the contentious question of whether freedom is compatible with determinism. I argue that the most defensible principle in traditional compatibilism is an epistemic one, according to which claims about freedom never provide justification for claims about a posteriori scientific hypotheses. Once we accept a perceptual account of the freedom relation, the truth of this principle turns on some subtle issues in the epistemology of perception. I discuss these issues and conclude that the compatibilist principle is one we should accept.