Cognitive Value and Theories in Semantics

Dissertation, The University of Rochester (1994)
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Abstract

Many contemporary philosophers accept the theory of direct reference as the correct semantic theory for proper names. According to this theory, the sole semantic content of a name is its referent. A consequence of the theory is that co-referential names have the same meaning. The theory of direct reference, along with some other theses, constitute a theory which I call "Naive Theory". The Naive Theory has some problems. The problem of cognitive value is one of them. It is a problem about how sentences which contain co-referential names can differ in cognitive value without differing in meaning. ;Since sentences containing co-referential names seem to differ in cognitive value, some philosophers argue that the meaning of a proper name contains something more than its referent. They argue further that the difference in cognitive value of those sentences cannot be explained if sentences with co-referential names have the same meaning. ;I argue that the difference in cognitive value can be explained without assigning any additional meaning to proper names other than their referents

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