Scham, Schuld und Anerkennung: zur Fragwürdigkeit Moralischer Gefühle

Berlin: De Gruyter (2013)
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Abstract

This work undertakes an innovative analysis of the feelings of shame and guilt. These feelings do not merely involve self-critical judgment. Instead, they are a form of anxiety about loss of recognition. People who achieve recognition have authority, and such authority is not based solely on good arguments. As a consequence, we should question whether feelings of shame and guilt are truly reconcilable with the ideal of autonomy.

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