Gödel’s Master Argument: what is it, and what can it do?

IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 2 (2):1-16 (2015)
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Abstract

This text is expository. We explain Gödel’s ‘Master Argument’ for incompleteness as distinguished from the 'official' proof of his 1931 paper, highlight its attractions and limitations, and explain how some of the limitations may be transcended by putting it in a more abstract form that makes no reference to truth.

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David Makinson
London School of Economics

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References found in this work

Circumscription — A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning.John McCarthy - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):27–39.
An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems.Peter Smith - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Generics and defaults.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Nicholas Asher - 1997 - In J. F. A. K. Van Benthem, Johan van Benthem & Alice G. B. Ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. Elsevier.
An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems.Peter Smith - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):218-222.
A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.

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