Abstract

When, if ever, is it permissible to take the life of an innocent human being? The Judeo-Christian moral tradition has maintained consistently that it is always wrong to kill the innocent, regardless of the consequences. This absolutism is a pivotal element that distinguishes it from contemporary consequentialism. Alan Donagan constructed a philosophical explanation of the moral content of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this explanation, he addressed the above question about innocent human life. ;This dissertation explicates and evaluates Donagan's response to this important question. In particular it analyzes the consistency of Donagan's arguments and judgments about the permissibility of taking innocent human life. The first chapter introduces some of the significant influences on Donagan's thought and situates his work within the context of contemporary moral philosophy. The second chapter explicates Donagan's general moral theory. The third chapter examines Donagan's objections to consequentialism and evaluates his treatment of cases of necessity. The fourth chapter investigates Donagan's views regarding abortion and analyzes the application of his moral theory to the abortion controversy. The fifth chapter treats Donagan's arguments regarding suicide. In chapters three, four and five, respectively, I argue that Donagan is not consistent in his treatment of cases of necessity, abortion and suicide. In the final chapter, I argue that Donagan's moral theory will benefit by giving greater significance to the intentions of moral agents. In particular, Donagan's theory should include something like the principle of double effect