Scientific materialism and the identity theory

Dialogue 3 (2):115-25 (1964)
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Abstract

My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes. I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about “mental events” or “conscious experiences” or “inner experiences.” These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One philosopher will say, for example, that a pain in the foot is a mental event, whereas another will say that a pain in the foot certainly is not a mental event.

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Citations of this work

The Polysemy View of Pain.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Mind and Language 38 (1):198-217.
La concebibilidad del mecanicismo.Norman Malcolm - 2024 - Euphyía - Revista de Filosofía 18 (34):369-411.
The Perceptual Theory of Pain.Thomas C. Mayberry - 1978 - Philosophical Investigations 1 (1):31-40.

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References found in this work

Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
Could mental states be brain processes?Jerome Shaffer - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.

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