The End of Thought Experiments?

Logos and Episteme 15 (3):359-367 (2024)
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Abstract

This reply is a refutation of Santiago Vrech’s article “The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments” (2022) which argues that thought experiments used in argumentation cannot hold in All Possible Worlds (APW) modality, and thus should end. Cases are used to justify or refute a philosophical theory, but should not have the power to refute an entire theory, especially ad infinitum. Significant variations in intuitions, he argues, invalidate cases and are not proven. I argue some variation is acceptable and expected, and his bar of criteria is too high—APW validity is unnecessary. Vrech’s three arguments are faulty and/ or too weak, and his thought experiment is of questionable value. Experimental and armchair philosophy (or philosophers) are misnomers, misleading and false dichotomy.

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Mark Maller
Duquesne University (PhD)

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