A difficult choice in preference theory: rationality implies completeness or transitivity but not both

In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press. pp. 373--402 (2001)
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Citations of this work

Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity.Toby Handfield - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):3-12.
The Argument from Small Improvement is a Red Herring.Thomas Raleigh - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Commensurability in perspective.Elijah Millgram - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):217-226.

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References found in this work

Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1861 - Cleveland: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1986 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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