On Feyerabend, general relativity, and 'unreasonable' universes

In Karim Bschir & Jamie Shaw (eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2021)
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Abstract

I investigate the principle *anything goes* within the context of general relativity. After a few preliminaries, I show a sense in which the universe is unknowable from within this context; I suggest that we 'keep our options open' with respect to competing models of it. Given the state of affairs, proceeding counter-inductively seems to be especially appropriate; I use this method to blur some of the usual lines between 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' models of the universe. Along the way, one is led to a useful collection of variant theories of general relativity -- each theory incompatible with the standard formulation. One may contrast one variant theory with another in order to understand foundational questions within 'general relativity' in a more nuanced way. I close by sketching some of the work ahead if we are to embrace such a pluralistic methodology.

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Jb Manchak
University of California, Irvine

References found in this work

Can we know the global structure of spacetime?John Byron Manchak - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (1):53-56.
Global Spacetime Structure.John Byron Manchak - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
Feyerabend, mill, and pluralism.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):407.
What Is a Physically Reasonable Space-Time?John Byron Manchak - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):410-420.

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