The Ontological Presuppositions of the Ontological Argument

In God, Belief, and Perplexity. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA (2016)
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Abstract

This chapter presents a reconstruction of Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence in English, identifying two principles on which the argument depends. The first is the claim that whatever is understood is in the understanding; the second is that for whatever exists solely in the understanding, something greater than it can be conceived. Most of the chapter focuses on the first principle. Anselm claims that there is an intimate connection between something’s being in the understanding and its being conceived. Moreover, he relies on a distinction between conceiving of something and conceiving that thing to exist. There are two ways of analyzing the distinction. Neither way provides Anselm with a sound argument for God’s existence.

Other Versions

original Mann, William E. (1972) "The Ontological Presuppositions of the Ontological Argument". Review of Metaphysics 26(2):260 - 277

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William Mann
Royal Holloway University of London

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