Abstract

Do we really have as much control over our behavior as we think we do? Might we be mistaken that our actions are ultimately up to us? Some philosophers argue that recent scientific research shows that we don't have the control required to act freely (even when we think we do) and, therefore, we should not be held responsible for what we do. This dissertation examines the scientific research that has been marshaled in support of such claims which I argue does not threaten our freedom and the control we have over our actions. This work proceeds by looking at four broadly construed areas of research in psychology: situationism, self-control, automaticity, and conscious control. I identify ways in which each research program has been used in an attempt to demonstrate that we do not have the control required to act freely. One research program that has been of interest to the free will community in philosophy and psychology is situationism. The results of situationism, which include demonstrating the behavioral effects of seemingly insubstantial situational features on our thoughts and actions, have been cited as a threat to our freedom of action on two fronts. The first is that situationism indicates a widespread absence of awareness of the reasons for which we act. The second has it that situationism actually disturbs some of our capacities to respond and react to reasons that are crucial for acting freely. I make a contribution to the debate involving the first sort of threat by developing a taxonomy of types of awareness along two dimensions: objects of awareness in acting freely and ways of being aware in acting freely. This allows me to evaluate what situationism demonstrates we are unaware of compared to what is required for free action. I defend the claim that the lack of awareness involved in situationism doesn't appear to threaten our prospects of acting freely. I make a contribution to the debate involving the second sort of threat by defending the claim that situationism hasn't demonstrated that the general or specific capacities required for acting freely have been hampered to such an extent that we are rendered unfree even if most participants in the situationist experiments fail to exercise such capacities. A second research program that has claimed to indicate a threat to our acting freely involves the study of self-control. Psychologists have demonstrated that our capacity for self-control relies on a limited resource the depletion of which impairs subsequent attempts to regulate behavior. I carefully examine this research and argue that while it may indicate an impairment in the degree to which we control our behavior, it is not diminished free will to such an extent that we are rendered unfree in a sense of lacking moral responsibility. I then look at research on automaticity that has been used to argue that we are not free and morally responsible. Such research maintains that automatic processes can perform tasks once thought to be unique to controlled conscious processes. This has led some psychologists and philosophers to conclude that there is little explanatory room left for conscious control and no need to posit free will. I take a critical look at such experiments and argue that they do not show that consciousness plays no role in acting and that we nonetheless have a significant amount of control over our behavior. Lastly, I look at Daniel Wegner's research on conscious control which is used to support the idea that our conscious will is an illusion. I argue not only that his claims rest on a mistaken notion of what is required for free will, but that the scientific experiments do not warrant the conclusion that our conscious will is entirely inefficacious