Abstract

According to traditional philosophy of science, good scientific methodology is both neutral and universal. The ideal of objectivity, however, is the target of much criticism within feminist theory. Attention to the nature of objectivity renders feminist theory in general continuous with feminist philosophy of science in particular. It also reveals unexpected connections between feminist and mainstream philosophy of science. Specifically, I argue that objectivity is a background requirement for the unity of science thesis and that a strong critique of objectivity therefore entails a critique of scientific unity. I then demonstrate that a critique of scientific unity does not, in turn, entail a critique of objectivity. Thus, objectivity is necessary but not sufficient for scientific unity. Stated another way, the epistemological issue of how we know bears on the metaphysical question of what we know without reciprocation from metaphysics to epistemology. Finally, building a bridge between critiques of objectivity and critiques of unity invites an alternative conception of science in which pluralism is deemed an asset, rather than an obstacle to scientific progress