Abstract

In Chapter Two, I carry out a detailed examination of Dewey's two major works on logical theory. The situatedness of inquiry, the centrality of practical judgment, the felt need to resolve tension or determine indeterminacy, the interplay between quality and quantity, and the desire to collapse the disciplines of epistemology and logic remain guiding principles throughout Dewey's logical writings. In Chapter Three, I look at the relationship between these principles and connectionist models in artificial intelligence. Even though Dewey deserves partial credit for laying the foundations of both design science and ecological psychology, his refusal to take the issue of symbolism seriously renders design science in many ways a more attractive theory of inquiry than Dewey's. In Chapter Four, I examine Dewey's claim that there is but one paradox, the paradox of theory and practice. I then consider three different ways in which that paradox manifests itself in Dewey's logic, and argue that the tension this paradox creates is less acute in Dewey's earlier work because he is not overtly concerned there to give an account of generality. Finally, in Chapter Five, I consider the way in which Dewey's reconception of logic makes imagination a necessary element in any logical theory. I look at some of the ways that our notions of imagination and creativity have evolved from oppression into virtual deification, and at Dewey's attempt to locate the common root of both logical and aesthetic forms in the artist's ability to create new rhythms in response to indeterminate situations. I conclude this Chapter by arguing that, despite Dewey's many interesting attempts to articulate how form and matter, the instrumental and the final, are all united in the work of art, there still remain a number of substantially unanswered questions about the process by which this is supposed to take place.