Identifying the problem of personal identity

In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Bradford. pp. 129 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie my proposal. Then I introduce the new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity that I am recommending, and I show that it avoids the difficulties facing the old ways. I also mention several vexing problems that arise in connection with certain popular views about personal identity, and I argue that if we formulate the problem of personal identity in the way that I am proposing, then each of these problems can be handled fairly easily. Finally, I show that there is an additional benefit to adopting my proposal, namely, that several other important problems facing anyone who endorses a 3D view of persistence (as opposed to the 4D, “temporal parts” view of persistence) can all be resolved in a relatively straightforward..

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Ned Markosian
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Becoming a Statue.Justin Mooney - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
The Matter of Coincidence.Justin Mooney - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (1):98-114.
Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Phasalist Approach to Coincidence Puzzles.Justin Mooney - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.

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References found in this work

Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 310-326.
Changes in Events and Changes in Things.Arthur N. Prior - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian. [REVIEW]Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):674–687.

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