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Monty Hall Saves Dr. Evil: On Elga’s Restricted Principle of Indifference
Erkenntnis 85 (1):65-76 (2020)
Abstract
In this paper I show that Elga’s argument for a restricted principle of indifference for self-locating belief relies on the kind of mistaken reasoning that recommends the ‘staying’ strategy in the Monty Hall problem.Other Versions
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2018-06-07
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Citations of this work
The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.
References found in this work
Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
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