Abstract

There is a consensus among Spinoza scholars that Spinoza holds some form of the correspondence theory of truth. However, this implies that experience has a role in the formation of one's ideas. Particular details of the way experience is involved in the production of some of one's ideas need further treatment. For instance, points such as; whether the identity of mind and body constitute direct acquaintance of ideas and objects; and if so, whether this is consistent with Spinoza's scepticism about knowledge from the senses; and whether any of the common notions are brought about by experience. ;The dissertation is developed through a discussion of why the correspondence theory is better than the coherence theory of truth for interpreting Spinoza's espistemology. It proceeds by taking Curley's attribution of a metaphysic of facts and propositions as a model of the experience by which ideas and their objects are related to each other. In spite of the direct acquaintance of the mind with its object, experience is no more than a sign of events occurring in the external world. However, a rational construction of the world may be made using the common notion of motion and rest, and reason. ;The conclusion of this work is that the following claims about Spinoza's philosophy hold true: First, that Spinoza believes in the direct acquaintance of mind and body, that experience is nevertheless only a sign of events in the external world, and that it is possible, in Spinoza's view, to make a rational construction of the external world. As part of this latter point, the common notion of motion and rest is known through experience