Abstract

I argue that the logical perspective—the study of arguments as products—is not well integrated into pragma-dialectics. I show that the Validity Rule and the Argumentation Scheme Rule, despite being procedural rules, are, in a certain sense, “logical” rules. Subsequently, I distinguish and review three successive periods in the development of the logical dimension of pragma-dialectics: conventionalist, inferentialist and dualist, to reveal that none of them is completely satisfactory. I contend that, given the assumptions and conceptual apparatus of pragma-dialectics, the integration of the logical perspective, and especially of a suitable account of counterargumentation, requires the adoption of a conception of logic as a theory of reasons, as opposed to the traditional conception of logic as a theory of inferences. Understanding logic as a theory of the dialogical construction of reasons enables us to approach the study of the relationships between arguments and the weighing of opposing arguments.