Abstract

Plato's Republic and Hegel's state are often interpreted as ultimately sacrificing an individual's civil and political liberties to the interest of some political organism as a whole . According to Hegel, since Plato neglects the "subjective principle," Platonic citizens, though they might be ethical, are not truly moral beings; they learn to fulfill their duties but have no understanding of why their duties are rationally obligatory and that they are true expressions of their own individual wills. ;I argue, however, that if one looks carefully at certain features of the Republic--the initial contract situation, the significance of the transition between the two cities, Plato's notion of a mastered soul, Plato's critique of democratic freedom, and the political virtue of moderation--it can be characterized as incorporating forms of the "subjective principle." The real deficiency with Platonic ethical life is not the absence of subjective freedoms but a lack of educating experiences or mediations which enable citizens to understand the rationality of the political order, to be motivated to act ethically to fulfill their duties in the polis, and to act in a truly self-determined way. Hegel solves the mediation problem much better than Plato; but I question just how much subjective freedom Hegelian citizens really enjoy. I also argue that Hegel's account of virtue leaves out an important psychological moment which makes his ethical theory incomplete. Hegel gives us a rich account of the necessary social and political conditions which make the exercise of the virtues meaningful, but he does a poor job describing what ethical experience would actually be like for an agent who must exercise moral judgment in a modern world. ;Finally, I contend that there is a deep irony in the Plato-Hegel relationship. The foundation of Hegel's state is the individual will, but Hegel ultimately defines the individual in political and social terms while excluding a crucial psychological dimension. Likewise, Plato, the alleged holist, gives more pride of place to the exercise of individual moral judgment with his focus on character