Interpretation and the Indefinability of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson

Analecta Hermeneutica 1:35-45 (2009)
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Abstract

Heidegger famously diminishes the significance of everyday theories of truth like the correspondence theory, disparaging these as a matter of ‘mere’ correctness.They are among the starting points that lead to ‘the true’ but are not themselves genuine or authentic. Donald Davidson develops a theory of interpretation that suggests some reasons why the ordinary senses of truth should not be so mistreated: responsible theories of interpretation should treat the everyday senses of truth more seriously. This paper argues that the necessity of convention T as a condition of interpretation means that correctness is essential both in philosophy and elsewhere

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Richard Matthews
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

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