Let's get real: The fallacy of post-modernism

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):16-32 (1998)
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Abstract

The anti-realist nihilism of post-modernist thought provides a constant challenge for science and scientists not only to refute this view but to make clear what constitutes science and the scientific method. The author reviews the major arguments of post-modern thought and its criticism of science and then provides a point by point refutation. The Popperian notion of refutability and empiricality provide the cornerstone of this discussion. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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