Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason

Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):1-16 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Spinoza holds a perspectivalist view of mereological composition, a form of anti-realism. The paper has two parts: In the first half of the paper, I introduce interpretive puzzles for the standard realist reading of Spinoza’s mereology. In the second half of the paper, I discuss Spinoza’s positive view on mereological composition and present a perspectivalist reading that avoids the interpretive puzzles.

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Róbert Mátyási
Saint Joseph's University of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

Spinoza on the resistance of bodies.Galen Barry - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 86 (C):56-67.
Schelling and Spinoza: realism, idealism, and the absolute.Benjamin Norris - 2022 - Albany: State University of New York Press.

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References found in this work

On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Ontology Made Easy.Amie Lynn Thomasson - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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