Abstract

The passage “it must not have a body” of Melissus’ B9 is in contradiction, real or apparent, with the contents of B3 ̶ “it must be always unlimited in magnitude” ̶ and B7 ̶ “it is full.” After all, how can something without a body have magnitude and fullness? In this manuscript, I propose what I call the “immateriality thesis,” a view according to which what-is, as it has no body, no thickness, and no parts, is also immaterial. To defend it, I first examine the relationship between the B9’s terms σῶμα (body) and πάχος (thickness) and the concepts of corporeality (“spatial limits”) and materiality (“physical constitution”) in the philosophical and medical literature of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Subsequently, I argue that, in B9, the denial of σῶμα and πάχος is equivalent to the denial of materiality to Melissus’ what-is. Furthermore, to support the “immateriality thesis,” I move away from the traditional strategies applied to resolve the incompatibility between B3, B7, and B9 and propose a new approach aiming to undo this Gordian knot of Melissus’ thought. I call it “modal analysis.” When applied to Melissan fragments, the “modal analysis” revealed the essential property of what-is, which is the indisputable assertion that it is τὸ ἓν (the one). Next, what-is’ accidental properties − μέγεθος (magnitude), πλέων (fullness), σῶμα (“lack of body”), and πάχος (“lack of thickness”) − were compared to the essential property. The upshot was that the “immateriality thesis,” although not without some difficulties, ended up being the best explanation we have left to interpret Melissus’ philosophy.