You can see what 'I' means

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper takes up the question of whether we can visually represent something as having semantic value. Something has semantic value if it represents some property, thing or concept. An argument is offered that we can represent semantic value based on a variety of number-color synesthesia. This argument is shown to withstand several objections that can be lodged against the popular arguments from phenomenal contrast and from the mundane example of reading.

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Jennifer Matey
Southern Methodist University

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References found in this work

Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.

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