Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Byrne & Hilbert conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “ color ” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a realist conception of “ color.”

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,665

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
71 (#291,587)

6 months
5 (#1,011,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rainer Mausfeld
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Citations of this work

Colour constancy as counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.

View all 102 references / Add more references