The Ontological Foundations for Natural Law Theory and Contemporary Ethical Naturalism

Abstract

This dissertation explores some objections to natural law theory- many of which are also leveled against contemporary naturalism. Despite the way the natural law tradition has fallen into disrepute in much of the American academy, this dissertation defends a classical Thomistic approach to natural law from some modern and contemporary criticisms. It begins with a brief explanation of the theory of natural law that will be defended from these contemporary objections. Chapter three examines G.E. Moore and David Hume's classical problems posed to natural law, along with some contemporary defenders of Moore's position. These arguments are purported to undermine using human nature as a basis for ethics. Chapter four considers how moral relativism, especially the form given by Gilbert Harmon and David Wong, offers a unique challenge to natural law that must be answered and one that seems to undermine any ethical theory than any account relying on human nature. Chapter five explores the relation between neo-naturalism and natural law. Although neo-naturalism is a position often thought of as opposed to natural law, the two share many similarities in the positions they oppose. The last chapter examines how natural law reasoning is used in making medical decisions. The overarching thesis is that, insofar as natural law is coherent and answers many major criticisms, the proposal to reexamine this ethical theory stands as viable

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-03

Downloads
21 (#995,074)

6 months
5 (#1,012,768)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bernard Mauser
Marquette University (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on moral realism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Utilitarianism and the virtues.Philippa Foot - 1985 - Mind 94 (374):196-209.
War and massacre.Thomas Nagel - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (2):123-144.

View all 36 references / Add more references