A limited skeptical threat [Book Review]

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:35-6 (2018)
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Abstract

Doris argues that our choices are heavily influenced by forces that we wouldn’t count as genuine reasons. This unsettling conclusion is motivated by a debunking argument so wide-ranging that it isn’t foisted upon us by the sciences. Doris sometimes seems to lower his ambitions when offering instead a skeptical hypothesis argument, but that conflicts with his aims in the book.

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Joshua May
University of Alabama, Birmingham

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References found in this work

Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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