Empirical Work in Moral Psychology

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Provides an overview of empirical research relevant to philosophical questions about moral thought, feeling, reasoning, and motivation. Topics include: free will and moral responsibility, egoism and altruism, moral judgment and motivation, weakness and strength of will, moral intuitions, and moral knowledge. [Originally published in 2012. Updated and expanded in 2017.]

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Naturalism and Moral Psychology.Christian B. Miller - 2015 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 416–434.
Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the normative significance of experimental moral psychology.Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):311-330.
The Science of Ethics.Ron Mallon & John M. Doris - 2000 - In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell. pp. 169-196.
Moral Reasoning on the Ground.Richmond Campbell & Victor Kumar - 2012 - Ethics 122 (2):273-312.
Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction.Valerie Tiberius - 2014 - London: Routledge.
Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality.Lisa Tessman - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.
Moral dumbfounding and the linguistic analogy: Methodological implications for the study of moral judgment.Susan Dwyer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions.Hanno Sauer - 2017 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-06-22

Downloads
1,000 (#21,324)

6 months
122 (#44,350)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joshua May
University of Alabama, Birmingham

Citations of this work

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Impartial reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 39 references / Add more references