Abstract

This dissertation examines some theoretical justifications for granting or denying "adult" legal rights to children, that could serve as a guide to Canadian legislators. The normative arguments of three authors are critically analyzed: John Rawls' paternalist position , Howard Cohen's liberationist position , and Laurence Houlgate's attempt to mediate between the liberationist and protectionist positions The analysis shows that whereas Rawls and Houlgate support their conclusions by postulating an extremely vague distinction between the cognitive capacities of adults and children, Cohen seems to ignore the gross distinctions between adults and very young children. It is suggested that in light of these difficulties, an analytic theory based on the norms and principles of the new Young Offenders Act seems preferable as a theoretical framework within which legislators can decide what legal rights children ought to have. Such a theory is constructed and defended. It is concluded that consistent application of those norms and principles to legal reform requires the extention of all "adult" rights to people who are twelve years of age and older.