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Can a Turing Machine Know That the Gödel Sentence is True?
Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):525-532 (1999)
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Citations of this work
On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
How do We Know that the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True?G. Sereny - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):47-73.
On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics.Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (1):81-88.
Turingův test: filozofické aspekty umělé inteligence.Filip Tvrdý - 2011 - Dissertation, Palacky University
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