Are Plans Necessary?

Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225-232 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to classical decision theory, an agent realises at time t the option with maximum expected utility (determined by his beliefs and desires at t), where the relevant options are possible actions performed at t. I consider an alternative according to which the relevant options are in general plans, complex courses of action extending into the future.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,297

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
86 (#245,076)

6 months
15 (#212,111)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
Oughts, options, and actualism.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.

View all 8 references / Add more references