Bringing Cognitive Science Back to Life

Idealistic Studies 29 (3):173-213 (1999)
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Abstract

It is worth noting that Wittgenstein provides an argument against analyticity that Quine allows. For Wittgenstein holds that even explicit conventions cannot determine "how one is to go on". I do not mean that Wittgenstein objects to analyticity. But this means he accounts for it in precisely the sorts of ways that Quine mentions but fails to pursue.

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