According to Fodor, beliefs (and I shall take these as exemplary) involve relations to internal representations: to believe that p is to be in a certain relation to some internal state s which represents

In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207 (1982)
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