Cinematic Philosophy: Experiential Affirmation in Memento

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (1):57-66 (2014)
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Abstract

This article demonstrates that Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) meets both conditions of Paisley Livingston's bold thesis of cinema as philosophy. I delineate my argument in terms of Aaron Smuts's clarifications of Livingston's conditions. The results condition, which is concerned with the nature of the philosophical content, is developed in relation to Berys Gaut's conception of narrational confirmation, which I designate ‘experiential affirmation.’ Because experiential affirmation is a function of cinematic depiction, it meets Livingston's means condition, which is concerned with the capacities of the medium or art form. I address two objections to my argument and conclude with a brief commentary on the implications for the broader relationship between film and philosophy

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Rafe McGregor
Edge Hill University

Citations of this work

Narrative Representation and Phenomenological Knowledge.Rafe McGregor - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):327-342.
Replies to Critics.Rafe McGregor - 2020 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 54 (4):62-75.
The Cognitive Value of Blade Runner.McGregor Rafe - 2015 - Aesthetic Investigations 1 (2).

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